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I.

INTRODUCTION

There’s no place like home—but what happens when an individual
is removed from the only home they have ever known? Familial child
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snatching is a widespread problem wreaking havoc on the law.1 The
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction2
(“Hague Convention”)3 provides for the immediate return of children who
are unlawfully removed from their country of habitual residence.4 The
signatory countries drafted the Hague Convention as a response to the
problem of estranged parents wrongfully taking children across
international borders from one signatory nation to another, and provides
for the child’s prompt return to the appropriate forum. 5 Under Article 12,
when a child who is a habitual resident of one signatory state is unlawfully
removed to another signatory state, the latter must order the return of the
child.6
Nevertheless, while aiming to provide a standard for quickly and
efficiently returning the child to his or her country of habitual residence,
the Hague Convention has proven to be an impediment, rather than a
solution, to the problem. As a result, there is a deep-rooted circuit split,
since the federal circuit courts have been left to formulate their own
standards. The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a standard
that focuses on the objective signs of a child’s acclimatization, while the
Second and Ninth Circuits have focused on the parents’ last shared
subjective intentions to determine the child’s habitual residence.7

1 See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION STATISTICS, available at http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/legal
/compliance/statistics.html (providing statistics that reflect the number of international
parental abduction cases reported to the United States Central Authority in 2012).
2 See Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction - Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions
.statusprint&cid=24 (providing a list of the contracting states to the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction).
3 Hague Convention on Private International Law, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501
[hereinafter Hague Convention].
4 While the Hague Convention does not define “habitual residence,” courts have been
instructed to interpret the phrase according to “the ordinary and natural meaning of the two
words it contains [, as] a question of fact to be decided by reference to all the circumstances
of any particular case.” C v S, 2 All E.R. 961, 965 (Eng.H.L. 1990).
5 See Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2013)(finding that a
signatory state is a state that contracts to “commit to have in place judicial and
administrative remedies for the return of children taken from the State of their habitual
residence to another signatory State in violation of the left-behind parent’s custody rights
under the law of the State of the child’s habitual residence.”)
6 See Convention of the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Explanatory
Report by Elisa Perez-Vera [Perez-Vera Report], ¶¶ 11, 13, & 16 (Vol. III), (1980),
available at http://www.haguejudicialresources.org/Hague_Judicial_Resources/PerezVeraReport.html.
7 Compare Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010), Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995), and Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400
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In its recent decision in Redmond v. Redmond, the Seventh Circuit
illustrated how sharply divided the circuits are regarding the proper
standard to determine habitual residence.8 Redmond involved a father who
filed a Hague Convention petition9 claiming that the mother wrongfully
retained their child in the United States.10 Although the parents had
initially agreed to raise their son in Ireland, the Seventh Circuit held that,
for purposes of the Hague Convention, his habitual residence was
Illinois.11 The court explained that the child was born in Illinois, and with
the exception of seven months during his infancy, he lived there,
maintained frequent contact with family members there, received
recurrent care from Illinois doctors, attended school, and established many
friendships in the area.12 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding that Ireland was the child’s habitual residence,13
finding the district court’s decision problematic because it considered the
parents’ “last shared intent” about where the child would live as a
dispositive factor.14 According to the Seventh Circuit, the district court
failed to consider the child’s perspective and disregarded what a child in
his position would have viewed as his habitual residence.15
In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged a split between the
circuits that follow a standard that focuses on the parents’ perspectives,
and “those that use a more child-centric approach.”16 The court asserted,
“in substance, all circuits—ours included—consider both parental intent
and the child’s acclimatization, differing only in their emphasis.”17 The
decision in Redmond appropriately illustrates the current problem, because
it demonstrates that the essence of the disagreement between the circuits
(6th Cir. 1993), with Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2005), and Mozes v.
Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
8 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).
9 In order to file a Hague Convention petition, the first step is to contact the country
officer assigned to the child’s case and determine what options are available. It is important
to submit a Hague petition as soon as practicable following an abduction or wrongful
retention. A custody order is not necessary in order to file a petition. The Hague petition
form should be filled out and submitted with the requisite supporting documentation.
Before submitting the petition, it is recommended that individuals consult with an attorney.
Once submitted, the petitioner should stay in close contact with the appropriate country
officer. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL CHILD ABDUCTION – FILING A
HAGUE APPLICATION, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/eng
lish/from/hague-app.html.
10 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 731.
11 Id. at 732.
12 Id. at 743.
13 Id. at 732.
14 Id. at 744.
15 Id.
16 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 745.
17 Id. at 746.
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is how much weight to give parental intent as opposed to the child’s
perspective.18
The Hague Convention provides a legal process for countries to work
together on international parental child abduction cases.19 In order for the
Hague Convention to apply, the child must have been habitually resident
in one signatory country, and wrongfully removed to, or retained in,
another signatory country.20 Courts in the child’s habitual residence are in
the best position to make custody determinations, and therefore, it is a
priority to ensure that they return there. Thus, the establishment of
habitual residence is a critical threshold determination in Hague
Convention proceedings. This Comment argues that courts should adopt
a hybrid subjective and objective reasonable person standard that focuses
on the child’s perspective and past experience. Such a standard would
most effectively adhere to both the spirit and letter of the Hague
Convention’s stated purpose. Part II of this Comment examines the
history of the Hague Convention and highlights its central purpose. Part
III discusses when the Hague Convention applies, and introduces the
vagueness of the habitual residence determination. Part IV analyzes the
variant approaches of the circuit courts, including both the child-centric
and parental intent models, and examines the case law leading up to
Redmond. Finally, Part V argues that a unified standard for determining
habitual residence is imperative to fulfill the fundamental goals of the
Hague Convention.
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION
Adopted in 1980, the Hague Convention intended to prevent parents
from fleeing internationally with their children in the hopes of receiving a
favorable custody determination in a more amenable jurisdiction.21 One
might assume that by including terms like “abduction” and “force,” the
drafters composed the treaty as a response to concern regarding forceful
kidnappings by strangers.22 On the contrary, the drafters composed the
treaty as a response to the unilateral and wrongful removal or retention of
children by a parent, guardian, or other family member.23

18

Id.
See generally, Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993);
Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.
2001).
20 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11.
21 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11.
22 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
23 Id. at 1069–70.
19
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Signatory states to the Hague Convention commit to protect children
from the deleterious effects of a child’s wrongful removal or retention,
which occur after those children are displaced from the family and social
environment in which they have developed.24 Still, the Hague Convention
is more than that. A primary objective of the Hague Convention is to
maintain the existing state of affairs and to allow the country with the
greatest connection to a child to make decisions about that child’s
custodial arrangement and future.25 When a court determines that a
particular country is the child’s habitual residence, that court should order
the child’s immediate return, unless certain exceptions apply.26
Nevertheless, this return is not necessarily required: (1) if the individual
claiming wrongful removal was not actually exercising their custody
rights at the time of removal or retention or consented to the removal or
retention; (2) if the child objects to being returned and has reached an age
of maturity; or (3) if returning the child to the country of habitual residence
would pose a serious threat of physical or psychological harm to the child
or violate human rights.27 Thus, the determination of habitual residence
has a profound and enduring impact on the child.
III.

APPLYING THE HAGUE CONVENTION: THE AMBIGUITY OF THE
HABITUAL RESIDENCE FACTOR

In order for the return remedy to apply under the Hague Convention,
a child’s removal or retention must be found to be wrongful under the
treaty.28 A showing of wrongful removal or retention hinges upon
demonstrating two requirements.29 Article 3 states, in pertinent part:
[T]he removal or the retention of a child is to be considered
wrongful where
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an
institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law
of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised
but for the removal or retention.30

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 11.
Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 20 (2010).
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 13.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.
Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.
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Moreover, Article 4 provides that the Hague Convention applies to a
child who habitually resided in a signatory state immediately before any
breach of custody or access rights, as long as the child is under the age of
sixteen.31
Once it is clear that the Hague Convention is applicable in a
particular situation, courts generally employ a four-part test to resolve the
issues stemming from Article 3.32 First, a court must ask when the removal
or retention at issue took place.33 Next, it should analyze the
circumstances directly prior to the removal or retention to discern which
country was the child’s habitual residence.34 After further examination to
see whether “the removal or retention breach[ed] the rights of custody35
attributed to the petitioner under the law of habitual residence,” a court
must finally decide whether the petitioner was “exercising those rights at
the time of the removal or retention.”36
The crux of the problem lies in the second question of the Hague
Convention analysis – determining the state of “habitual residence” – as
the Hague Convention itself neither defines nor elaborates on the term.37
Furthermore, minimal case law exists regarding the interpretation of the
Hague Convention, and the cases that do address the term, fail to provide
concrete guidance on the meaning of “habitual residence.”38
IV. THE VARIANT APPROACHES OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS
As recognized in Redmond, the circuits are currently split regarding
the appropriate standard to be used.39 This split has its roots in the
disagreement over what factors the courts should consider in determining
31

Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 4.
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 An example of breaching custody rights would be if one parent sought sole custody
over a child outside the habitual residence and thus disregarded the rights of the other
parent, protected by law, and interfered with their normal exercise. See Perez-Vera, supra
note 6, at ¶ 11.
36 Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1070.
37 See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 42 (2010)(exploring other countries’ interpretation
of the Hague Convention, but noting that while Congress has instructed that a uniform
interpretation is inherent in the Convention’s framework, the Court “should not substitute
the judgment of other courts for our own.”); see also id. (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 375 (1998))(stating that “while we should give respectful consideration to the
interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction
to interpret such, it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express
statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the
implementation of the treaty in that State.”).
38 Id.
39 Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).
32
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a child’s habitual residence, and the weight to give to the parents’ and
child’s perspectives. Because “[t]he Hague Convention is generally
intended to restore the pre-abduction status quo and to deter parents from
crossing borders in search of a more sympathetic court,” the determination
of habitual resident is essential. 40 Generally, the Third, Sixth, and Eighth
Circuits have shaped a standard that stresses the importance of focusing
on the child’s perspective, while the Second and Ninth Circuits have
formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared intentions.
A. The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits: The Child’s Perspective
The majority of the circuits tasked with interpreting the proper test
for habitual residence under the Hague Convention have explicitly
recognized the primacy of the child’s point of view.41 When determining
which country is the child’s habitual residence, these circuits approach the
inquiry by focusing on the child’s perspectives and past experience, and
place significantly less weight on, and occasionally disregard, the parents’
intentions and future plans.42 These cases highlight the notion that
focusing on the parents’ shared intent at the time the child was born sheds
little light on the question of the child’s habitual residence at the time of
the alleged wrongful removal, which often occurs years later.43
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to determine
whether a parent’s unilateral removal of a child from one country to
another was “wrongful.”44 In its 1993 decision Friedrich v. Friedrich, the
court engaged in one of the earliest applications of the Hague Convention
in the United States.45 The Sixth Circuit heard the case of Mr. Friedrich,
who appealed the denial of his petition for the return of his son, Thomas,
to Germany.46 Thomas was twenty-one months old at the time of the
petition, which alleged that Thomas’s mother had removed him from
Germany to the United States days after the couple separated, without Mr.
Friedrich’s knowledge or consent.47

40

Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th
Cir. 1993).
42 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
43 See, e.g., Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010); Feder v. EvansFeder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th
Cir. 1993).
44 Id. at 1398.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
41
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Acknowledging that the Hague Convention fails to define “habitual
residence,”48 the Sixth Circuit further noted that no United States cases
supplied guidance on the interpretation of habitual residence, and that
minimal case law existed on the Hague Convention at all.49 The court
posited that habitual residence should not be mistaken for domicile,50 and
formulated its own standard to determine the habitual residence, stating,
“the court must focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past
experience, not future intentions.”51 The court explained that a child can
have only one habitual residence, and it was imperative for courts to look
back in time, rather than forward.52
Because it is natural that a family may choose to relocate over the
course of a child’s life, the Sixth Circuit elaborated on what should be
considered when deciding whether a child’s habitual residence has
changed.53 The court asserted that habitual residence could only be
modified by a change in geography and the passage of time, and not by
changes in parental care and responsibility.54 The court stressed that the
requisite change in geography had to occur before the alleged unlawful
removal in order to be given any effect.55 To hold otherwise, or to focus
the inquiry solely on the parental perspective, would enable parents to
abduct their children and later characterize their wrongful removals as
changes in habitual residence.56 Such a standard would render the Hague
Convention virtually meaningless.57 As other circuits have noted, this idea
highlights the court’s tendency to emphasize the importance of the child’s
point of view and downplay parental intent.58
When applying its new standard to the facts of the case, the Sixth
Circuit found that Mrs. Friedrich’s focus on her future plans disregarded
Thomas’s point of view.59 Mrs. Friedrich argued that, although Thomas’s
ordinary residence was always in Germany, Thomas was a habitual
resident of the United States because he possessed United States
citizenship—his United States documentation listed his address as Ohio—
48

Id. at 1400.
Id. at 1400–01.
50 See Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401 (noting that while common law domicile is more of
a technical term of art, habitual residence is a factual determination that looks to the
individual facts and circumstances of each situation without relying on pre-suppositions).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 1401–02.
54 Id. at 1402.
55 Id.
56 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1402.
57 Id.
58 Redmond, 724 F.3d at 744.
59 Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.
49
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and because she eventually intended to return, with Thomas, to the United
States.60 The court reasoned that it was erroneous to rely on factors that
solely reflected the intention of Mrs. Friedrich, when it is the perspective
of the child that is significant.61 The court stated that even though Mrs.
Friedrich established a connection between Thomas and the United States,
and may have intended for Thomas to move there at some point in the
future, Thomas was born in and resided solely in Germany for his entire
life.62 Therefore, any future plans to reside in the United States were
immaterial to the habitual residence inquiry.63 Deeming it a “simple case,”
the Sixth Circuit ultimately held that Germany was Thomas’s habitual
residence at the time of his removal.64 Consequently, the court ordered
Thomas’s return to Germany for the resolution of the custody dispute
under German law.65
In 1995, the Third Circuit faced the same issue of determining a
standard for interpreting habitual residence in Feder v. Evans-Feder.66
Feder involved two American citizens who met in Germany in 1987 and
whose son, Evan, was born in Germany in 1990.67 The family moved
several times; first to Pennsylvania in 1990, then to Australia in January
1994.68 Shortly thereafter, the couple’s relationship deteriorated.69 Mrs.
Feder decided that she wanted to leave Mr. Feder and return to the United
States with Evan, telling Mr. Feder that she wished to take Evan to visit
her parents in Pennsylvania.70 On June 29, 1994, Mrs. Feder took Evan to
the United States, but neither she, nor Evan, ever returned to Australia.71
In his petition, Mr. Feder alleged that Mrs. Feder had wrongfully retained
their son in the United States, and demanded Evan’s return to Australia.72
The district court concluded that the United States was Evan’s habitual
residence.73

60

Id.
Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 1402.
65 See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3 (explaining that whether a parent was
exercising lawful custody rights over a child at the time of removal must be determined
under the law of the child’s habitual residence).
66 63 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1995).
67 Id. at 218.
68 Id. at 219.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 219–20.
71 Id. at 220.
72 Feder, 63 F.3d at 220.
73 Id. at 224.
61
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On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that a child’s habitual
residence is where he or she has been physically present for a period of
time sufficient for acclimatization and perceives a “degree of settled
purpose.”74 The court further reasoned that, when determining what
satisfies this standard, a court must engage in an analysis focusing on the
child and analyzing the child’s circumstances, coupled with the parents’
present, shared intentions.75 Applying this standard to the facts of the case,
the Third Circuit concluded that Australia was Evan’s habitual residence
immediately prior to his removal to the United States by his mother.76
Evan remained in Australia for close to six months prior to the removal,
and the court viewed this as a meaningful amount of time for a four-yearold child.77 The court also found the fact that Evan had attended preschool in Australia and enrolled in kindergarten for the coming year
persuasive.78
The court noted that although Mr. and Mrs. Feder differed on their
opinions regarding living in Australia, they still clearly set out to make a
new home for themselves and their family there.79 They bought a new
house, pursued employment, and organized Evan’s long-term schooling.80
The court asserted that the fact that “Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain
in Australia permanently and believed that she would leave if her marriage
did not improve does not void the couple’s settled purpose to live as a
family in the place where Mr. Feder had found work.”81 This conclusion
highlights the Third Circuit’s emphasis on the principles announced in
Friedrich, downplaying parental intent and looking to the past rather than
the future when attempting to ascertain habitual residence.82 The court
deemed the fact that Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in Australia
irrelevant.83 The fact that Evan lived in Australia for the period leading
up to his “removal” was more important than where Mrs. Feder intended
Evan to live in the future.84
Although the Feder court’s analysis considered the parents’ actions,
the crux of the inquiry still focused on the child’s perspective.
Furthermore, while it gave more attention to the parents’ settled purpose
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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than the Sixth Circuit did in Friedrich, the Third Circuit also gave
significantly more weight to Evan’s perspective, concluding that he was
physically present for a sufficient amount of time to become acclimatized
with his situation in Australia, achieving an adequate “degree of settled
purpose” from his perspective.85 Thus, the Third Circuit found that the
district court placed unnecessary emphasis on the fact that Evan had spent
the majority of his life in the United States, ignoring the circumstances of
his life in Australia leading up to the alleged wrongful removal.86
While Feder seems to conflict with the holding of Friedrich, in
which the Sixth Circuit focused on the fact that the child spent his entire
life in Germany, the cases are factually distinguishable. Even though a
child can only have one habitual residence at a particular point in time,
habitual residence can change over time depending on a family’s
individual circumstances.87 Habitual residence can be altered by change
in geography, and when a child relocates, they re-start the
“acclimatization” process.88 Thus, what matters is not necessarily where
the child spent the majority of his or her life, but rather, the last place in
which the child spent enough time and would consider herself, from her
perspective, settled in that place.89 While the Third and Sixth Circuits do
not share an identical standard for determining habitual residence, they do
share a commitment to placing significantly more weight on the child’s
perspectives and past residency, rather than the parents’ intentions and the
future.90
In 2010, the Eighth Circuit similarly struggled when determining the
standard to apply when deciding a child’s habitual residence in Barzilay v.
Barzilay.91 Mr. Barzilay appealed from the district court’s dismissal of his
petition claiming that his former wife unlawfully retained their three
children in Missouri, and sought an order compelling their relocation to
Israel.92 Mr. and Mrs. Barzilay were Israeli citizens who married in Israel
in 1994 and had three children.93 The oldest child, an Israeli citizen, was
born in Israel, while the other two children, holding dual American and
Israeli citizenship, were born in Missouri.94 In 2001, Mr. and Mrs.
85

Id.
Id.
87 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
88 Id.
89 Feder, 63 F.3d at 224.
90 See, e.g., Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1995); Friedrich v.
Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).
91 Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2010).
92 Id. at 914.
93 Id.
94 Id.
86
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Barzilay obtained American work visas and moved from the Netherlands,
where they had lived for approximately two years, to Missouri.95 The
children resided in Missouri from 2001 until the commencement of
relevant court proceedings in 2006.96 The oldest child had not lived in
Israel since her early youth, while the other two children never lived
there.97 Based on these facts, the district court found that the children’s
country of habitual residence was the United States, because they had lived
in Missouri for about five years prior to the commencement of the
wrongful retention action.98
The Eighth Circuit articulated that the first step in Hague Convention
cases is to determine when the alleged wrongful removal or retention took
place.99 According to the Eighth Circuit, when determining habitual
residence, the significant time to analyze is immediately before the
removal or retention.100 The court highlighted several factors that are
relevant to the inquiry, including “the settled purpose of the move to the
new country from the child’s perspective, parental intent regarding the
move, the change in geography, the passage of time, and the
acclimatization of the child to the new country.”101 The court elaborated
on these elements, noting that settled purpose does not mean that the
individuals will stay in a new location forever, but that the family must
have a “sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as
settled.”102 Moreover, settled purpose should be discerned from the child’s
perspective, although parental intent should also be considered.103
The court reiterated the analysis of the district court and agreed with
its conclusion that the children’s place of habitual residence was the
United States.104 The district court had found that two of the children lived
in Missouri for their entire lives, and the oldest child had lived there for
five years.105 The court found nothing in the record to suggest that the
children had spent any considerable amount of time in another country,
and from the children’s perspective, the “settled purpose of the family’s
residence in Missouri was to remain there permanently.”106 While noting
that parental intent was ambiguous in this case, the district court decided
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id. at 914–15.
Id. at 917–18.
Id.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Barzilay, 600 F.3d at 918.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 918.
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that Mr. and Mrs. Barzilay had abandoned their previous habitual
residence when they moved to Missouri and planned to remain there
indefinitely.107
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that
the children were sufficiently acclimatized to life in the United States.108
The Eighth Circuit explained that the oldest child was the only one who
experienced a substantial change in geography, and by 2006 she had spent
approximately five years—half of her life—in the United States.109
Furthermore, the two younger children had always lived in Missouri.110
The court also gave considerable weight to the fact that the children
attended school in United States, and had never attended school in
Israel.111 The Eighth Circuit agreed that, under the Hague Convention, the
children’s country of habitual residence was the United States.112 The
court found no evidence demonstrating that the children spent any
meaningful amount of time outside of the United States since 2001, or that
the children had reason to believe that their home was a place other than
Missouri.113 In so holding, the Eighth Circuit focused on the children’s
perspective, giving considerable weight to which country the children
would view as their home.114
B. The Second and Ninth Circuits: The Parents’ Shared Intent
Although the majority of circuit courts that have addressed the issue
have found that focusing on the child’s perspective in habitual residence
determinations most effectively fulfills the purpose of the Hague
Convention, some courts have stressed the importance of focusing on the
parents’ perspective.115 These circuits apply a standard that solely
examines the shared intentions of the parents when determining which
country is the child’s habitual residence. These cases highlight the notion
that focusing on the parents’ shared intent is inevitable because children
lack the wherewithal to decide where they want to reside.116
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes v. Mozes is the leading case
that focuses on the parents’ perspective in determining a child’s habitual
107
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residence.117 Mr. and Mrs. Mozes were Israeli citizens who were married
in 1982 and had four children between the ages of seven and sixteen at the
time of the disputed removal.118 The family lived in Israel until 1997,
when Mrs. Mozes and the children moved to Los Angeles, California, with
Mr. Mozes’s consent.119 The parents agreed that the children would
benefit from attending school in the United States, so Mrs. Mozes moved
with the children to Beverly Hills, where she leased a home, bought
automobiles and registered the children for school.120 While Mr. and Mrs.
Mozes agreed that Mrs. Mozes and the children would remain in the
United States for fifteen months, they disagreed as to what arrangement
existed beyond that.121
A year after they settled in the United States, Mrs. Mozes sought
dissolution of the marriage and custody of the children.122 Mr. Mozes then
filed a petition seeking to have the children returned to Israel. In his
petition, Mr. Mozes claimed that Mrs. Mozes wrongfully retained the
children in the United States when she sought dissolution of the marriage
and custody of the children.123 While the oldest child elected to return to
Israel voluntarily, Mr. Mozes appealed the district court’s denial of his
petition with regard to the three other children.124
The court addressed the question of whose settled intention dictates
whether a child has deserted a prior habitual residence, and asserted that
while the intuitive answer would be the child, this approach is flawed.125
The court reasoned that there is an “obvious problem” with focusing on
the child’s perspective and disregarding parental intent, as children often
lack the wherewithal to determine where they will reside.126 The court
thus concluded that “the intention or purpose which has to be taken into
account is that of the person or persons entitled to fix the place of the
child’s residence.”127 According to the court, when parents jointly plan to
raise a child in a place and live there, that place becomes the child’s
habitual residence.128 While the court determined that a child’s country of
habitual residence could ultimately change if the parents mutually decide
to abandon one habitual residence in favor of another, it maintained that
117
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the unilateral intention of only one parent is insufficient to establish a new
habitual residence for a child.129
The Ninth Circuit explained that even though children can be
exceptionally adaptable and form strong attachments in short periods of
time, they do not necessarily expect or intend those relationships to last.130
The court further reasoned that children might participate in activities of
daily life and still retain awareness that they have another life to which
they will return.131 The Ninth Circuit asserted that the appropriate inquiry
was not solely whether the children had become settled in the United
States, but whether the United States had replaced Israel as the center of
the children’s familial and social development.”132 Because the district
court failed to answer this question, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case.133
It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a
difficulty arises “when the persons entitled to fix the child’s residence no
longer agree on where it has been fixed.”134 The court, which focused on
the parents’ intent, implicitly recognized a significant flaw in its own
analysis.135 The court attempted to address this issue by dividing these
situations into three categories.136 The first includes cases where the
family demonstrated a settled purpose to alter habitual residence, even
though one parent had reservations about the move.137 The court stated
that, in these situations, one parent’s qualms about moving would not
prevent a finding of a shared and settled purpose.138 The second category
includes cases where the child’s move from an established habitual
residence was intended to be only for a limited period.139 The court noted
that, in these situations, the changed intentions of one parent do not lead
to an alteration of the child’s habitual residence.140 The third category
consists of cases where the petitioning parent had previously agreed to let
the child remain abroad for an uncertain duration.141 The court stated that
sometimes it will infer a mutual abandonment of the child’s previous
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habitual residence, and other times the court will not be able to recognize
a settled mutual intent from which to presume abandonment.142
Gitter v. Gitter, out of the Second Circuit, also formulated a habitual
residence standard emphasizing a focus on the parents’ intentions. 143
Gitter involved two individuals who were born in Israel, later met in New
York, married, and had a son, Eden.144 After Eden’s birth, Mr. Gitter
wanted to move to Israel, and although Mrs. Gitter was hesitant, he
ultimately convinced her.145 About a year after the family had moved,
Mrs. Gitter took their son on a trip to New York and never returned to
Israel.146 Mr. Gitter filed a petition seeking Eden’s return to Israel under
the Hague Convention.147
In reviewing Mr. Gitter’s petition, the Second Circuit was greatly
influenced by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes.148 The court
reiterated the “importance of intentions (normally the shared intentions of
the parents or others entitled to fix the child’s residence) in determining a
child’s habitual residence.”149 The court elaborated on the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning, stating that merely observing the child’s behavior was a
defective approach because it may produce remarkably different results
depending on the time frame.150 For these reasons, the Second Circuit
concluded that it would specifically focus on the intent of those entitled to
decide the place of the child’s residence, which are likely to be the
parents.151
When examining the pertinent facts, the Second Circuit looked at
whether Mr. and Mrs. Gitter shared the intent that Israel would remain
Eden’s habitual residence.152 The court agreed with the district court in
finding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter only agreed to move to Israel on a
conditional basis.153 Concluding that Mr. and Mrs. Gitter did not intend
for Israel to be Eden’s habitual residence, and taking into account the fact
that the district court was unaware of the proper legal standard, the court
remanded the case so that the district court could view the facts in light of
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the opinion.154 The Second Circuit acknowledged that because the Hague
Convention is focused on the habitual residence of the child, it would
appear logical to focus on the child’s intentions.155 Nevertheless, weary of
the fact that young children often lack the capacity to decide where they
will reside, the court followed Mozes and agreed “it is more useful to focus
on the intent of the child’s parents or others who may fix the child’s
residence.”156
Redmond v. Redmond, one of the most recent cases addressing the
standard for determining habitual residence, recognized the magnitude of
the circuit split regarding the standard that should be used in determining
habitual residence.157 The court did not follow any of the other circuits’
approaches, noting that it was imprudent to set the relative weights of
parental intent and the child’s perspective in stone.158 The court posited
that, “the habitual residence inquiry remains essentially fact-bound,
practical, and unencumbered with rigid rules, formulas, or
presumptions.”159 The Seventh Circuit failed to set forth a structured
standard, and did not resolve how to balance the parents’ and child’s
perspectives, inadvertently deepening the divide amongst the circuits.
V. ELIMINATING THE DIVIDE: A HYBRID SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE
REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD FOCUSING ON THE CHILD’S
PERSPECTIVE
This part argues that it is necessary for courts to follow a uniform
approach when deciding a child’s habitual residence, focusing on the
perspective of the child rather than the parents, and examining past
experiences rather than future intentions. This Comment proposes a
hybrid subjective and objective standard concentrating on which country
a reasonable person in the child’s particular situation would view as his or
her country of habitual residence. The federal circuit courts remain
divided regarding the appropriate standard for determining habitual
residence. While the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have shaped a
standard that focuses on the child’s perspective, the Second and Ninth
Circuits have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last
shared intentions.
It is vitally important for the Supreme Court to step in to resolve the
existing split and provide a uniform standard. Clarity and uniformity is
154
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particularly essential when dealing with jurisdictional and international
disputes.160 The Hague Convention is designed to address international
adjudications by foreign nations that inherently possess materially
dissimilar legal, cultural, and social systems. The grave differences in the
circuit courts’ reasoning demonstrate that a fixed standard is necessary to
properly regulate enforcement. Lack of consistency also complicates the
enforcement process by decreasing the certainty of the outcome and
becoming an unnecessarily lengthy process, which can be detrimental to
the child involved.161
Courts are inconsistently enforcing individuals’ rights due to the
variation of habitual residence standards. While the Ninth Circuit holds
that courts should focus on the parents’ shared intent because children lack
the wherewithal to decide where they want to reside, this approach is
flawed. 162 Parents often disagree as to their last shared intent in Hague
Convention cases, leaving the courts with an ill-suited standard. Similarly,
although the Third Circuit holds that “a child’s habitual residence is the
place where he or she has been physically present for an amount of time
sufficient for acclimatization and which has a ‘degree of settled purpose’
from the child’s perspective,” case law has failed to determine what
exactly is an appropriate amount of time sufficient for acclimatization.163
The Eighth Circuit characterizes its habitual residence test as the location
where a family possesses “a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly
described as settled,” but there is a shortage of guidance regarding what
constitutes a “sufficient degree.” 164 These inconsistencies further
strengthen the necessity for a uniform international interpretation.
The goal of the Hague Convention is to maintain the status quo as
well as protect the best interests of the child.165 What a parent may have
“hoped” for a child is irrelevant to what the child actually experienced.
Because the Hague Convention is concerned with a child’s habitual
residence, the child’s perspective of habitual residence should be the only
perspective considered. This standard most closely relates to the
principles set forth by the Sixth Circuit in Friedrich, which found that “to
160 See Why States Should Adopt UCCJEA, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, available at
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt
%20UCCJEA (explaining how the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act (UCCJEA) and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) are acts that “provide
uniformity of law, necessary in a time when the mobility of the American public makes it
imperative to have laws regarding child custody determinations uniform from state to
state.”).
161 Id.
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165 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1400 (6th Cir. 1993).

472

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 11:454

determine the habitual residence, the court must focus on the child, not the
parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.”166 Ordering
a return remedy under the Hague Convention enables the courts of the
home country to determine what is in the child’s best interests, and should
focus on the child’s experience and perspective.
An appropriate approach would be a hybrid subjective and objective
standard, focusing on which country a reasonable person in the situation
would view as their country of habitual residence. This subjective
component will enable a court to consider the child’s age, capacity, and
maturity, and the objective component will allow a court to consider a
child’s perspective, from a reasonable person in that situation.167 A child
who spends his or her entire life in country A, and never lived in country
B, would likely view country A as his or her habitual residence. Thus,
even if the child’s parents intended for country B to be the habitual
residence, it would undeniably serve the best interests of the child to
remain in country A.168 This standard is reconcilable with Friedrich, as it
emphasizes both the child’s perspective and past experiences.
Furthermore, it is imperative that courts focus on what the child actually
experienced, rather than what the parents intended for the child to
experience, because the Hague Convention aims to protect the best
interests of the child.169
The Second and Ninth Circuits misconstrue the standard set out by
those courts that emphasize the child-centric approach. 170 The courts that
focus on the child’s perspective do not suggest that in order to determine
habitual residence courts must look at where the child perceived he or she
would reside in the future. Rather, these courts analyze, from the child’s
point of view, the place in which they spent considerable time before the
alleged wrongful removal and would consider themselves settled.171 The
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Second and Ninth Circuits, however, mistakenly focus on future intentions
rather than past reality.
When a couple first has a child, they can choose to raise that child in
any place they desire. But, when determining habitual residence, this
intent is irrelevant if the child establishes a settled lifestyle in a completely
different place. The Second and Ninth Circuit’s focus on the parents’ last
shared intent leads to inconsistent outcomes and does not enable courts to
make decisions in the best interests of the child.172 While the Ninth Circuit
alleges that children lack the wherewithal to decide where they will reside,
this claim is misguided. 173 The habitual residence inquiry should be more
concerned with where a child has been in the past, and where they were
settled leading up the alleged wrongful removal. The way in which the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”)
defines “home state” is particularly instructive when determining a child’s
habitual residence under the Hague Convention.174 The UCCJEA is a
Uniform Act drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1997.175 The UCCJEA was drafted to achieve
uniformity in state laws regarding jurisdiction and custody matters in order
to avoid disputes between competing jurisdictions.176 The UCCJEA’s
primary purpose is to vest “exclusive and continuing jurisdiction” for child
custody litigation in the courts of the child’s “home state.”177
The UCCJEA and the Hague Convention are comparable because
both “provide for a reasoned determination of where jurisdiction over a
custody dispute is properly placed,” and do so from the child’s
perspective.178 The UCCJEA defines “home state” as the state where the
child has lived with a parent for six continuous months prior to the
commencement of the proceeding, or since birth for children younger than
six months.179 If the child has not lived in any state for at least six
consecutive months, the court will look to see which state has “significant
172 Gitter v. Gitter, 396 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2005); Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th
Cir. 2001).
173 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001).
174 Annotation, Construction and Operation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (2002), 100 A.L.R.5th 1.
175 Stephens v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., 331 Mont. 40, 42 (2006).
176 Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act – Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM
LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Child%20Custody%20
Jurisdiction%20and%20Enforcement%20Act (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (showing that the
UCCJEA has been adopted by 49 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands).
177 Annotation, Construction and Operation of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (2002), 100 A.L.R.5th 1.
178 Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 203 (3d Cir.2005).
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connections” with the child and at least one parent and “substantial
evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal
relationships.”180 Once a court has selected an appropriate “home state,”
that state may assume child-custody jurisdiction.181 The “home state”
determination thus focuses on where the child has spent the majority of his
or her life, rather than any shared intention the parents may have had.
It is clear that the “home state” determination is an approach from
the child’s perspective, specifically because the state must have significant
connections with the child and at least one parent—but not both parents.182
Additionally, the court applying the UCCJEA is interested in the
substantial evidence regarding the child’s “care, protection, training, and
personal relationships” rather than the parental intent for any of these
factors.183 The UCCJEA’s approach suggests that the child’s perspective,
regardless of age, trumps parental intent, and that past experiences take
precedence over future intentions.184
In Delvoye v. Lee, the Third Circuit addressed the Ninth Circuit’s
claim that a child-centric approach is problematic because young children
are not capable of possessing a perspective. 185 The case involved a
habitual residence determination for a 2-month-old baby.186 The court
noted that an infant’s habitual residence is not necessarily the habitual
residence of the parents, and emphasized that a young child “will normally
have no habitual residence until living in a country on a footing of some
stability.”187 This reasoning helps demonstrate that, even for the youngest
children, habitual residence must be viewed from the child’s
perspective.188 Specifically, courts must look at the circumstances of the
child to determine the country that served as the focal point of the child’s
lifestyle and social development, even if that point consisted of a short
period of time.189 The Third and Eighth Circuits have stated that in no way
does an infant’s habitual residence automatically become that of its
mother.190 It would be inconsistent with the Hague Convention to derive
180
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a child’s habitual residence from its mother, because it would “create an
impermissible presumption that the child’s habitual residence is wherever
the mother happens to be.”191
The proposed standard focusing on the child is further bolstered by
several inherent weaknesses of any approach focusing on parental intent.
In Gitter, the Second Circuit stated that, “[i]n the easy case, the parents (or
others entitled to determine the child’s residence) will agree on where the
child’s habitual residence is fixed, and we are likely to conclude that the
child’s habitual residence is as intended.”192 Yet, at the same time, the
court recognized that “[i]n nearly all of the cases that arise under the
Convention, however, the parents have come to disagree as to the place of
the child’s habitual residence.”193 This explicit acknowledgement of the
tension inherent in its own approach demonstrates the significant problem
with focusing on parental intent, because there is most likely a
disagreement over which country the parents intended as the child’s
habitual residence. Another inevitable flaw in following the Second and
Ninth Circuit’s approach is that an emphasis on shared parental intent does
not work when the parents are essentially estranged from the outset, which
is often the circumstance in Hague Convention cases. 194 An obvious
problem in such disputes is that the parents often possess different
intentions for the habitual residence of their child. These inconsistent
solutions to various situations demonstrate that focusing on the parents’
last shared intent is not an effective method, because it proves to be erratic
and unpredictable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction in 1980, courts have struggled to set forth a
standard to determine a child’s habitual residence. Lack of guidance from
the Hague Convention itself has forced the federal circuit courts to shape
their own standards, leading to erratic application of the Hague
Convention and unpredictable outcomes in the respective proceedings.
The Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have constructed a standard that
focuses on the child’s perspective while the Second and Ninth Circuits
have formulated a standard that emphasizes the parents’ last shared
intentions.
In a Hague Convention proceeding, courts should conduct a hybrid
subjective and objective reasonable person test focusing solely on the
191
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child’s perspective, which looks to past experiences. Any analysis to the
contrary—specifically one that focuses parents’ shared intent—is flawed
in numerous significant ways. Hague Convention proceedings primarily
arise when parents no longer agree on the child’s habitual residence, and
often involve estranged parents. To focus on the perspectives of people
involved in this sort of dynamic is ineffective and disadvantageous.
Moreover, it is unfitting to focus on the parents’ perspective when it is the
child’s habitual residence that must be determined. A uniform standard is
imperative in order to properly fulfill the Hague Convention’s purposes.
As such, courts should adopt a hybrid subjective and objective reasonable
person standard that focuses on the child’s perspective and past
experiences.

